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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 David Fields has appealed his conviction and sentence 
for violations of the federal drug laws.  He argues that his 
indictment should have been dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., and that the district court erred in 
calculating his sentence.  We affirm the defendant's conviction, 
but we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant 
to United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992). 
  
 I. 
 On September 17, 1992, the defendant was indicted in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania for (count one) possession, 
with the intent to distribute, of less than 100 grams of heroin, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (count two) possession, 
with intent to distribute, of less than 100 grams of heroin 
within 1000 feet of a public school or playground, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); and (count three) use of a person under 18 
 
 
years of age to deliver heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
861(a)(1).  On September 25, the defendant was taken before a 
magistrate judge in Pittsburgh for an initial appearance.  On 
October 6, the defendant's attorney moved for an extension of the 
time for filing pretrial motions under the local rules, and on 
October 7 the district court granted an extension until October 
24, which was a Saturday (thus making those motions due on 
Monday, October 26).  The order granting the extension stated: 
  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the extended 
time period within which defendant may file 
pretrial motions be excluded under Title 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A), since the court finds 
that the additional period is necessary to 
enable counsel for the defendant adequately 
to investigate and prepare pretrial motions.1 
 
 A change of plea hearing was subsequently requested, 
and because the judge to whom the case had initially been 
assigned was involved in a trial in Erie, another judge agreed to 
preside at that hearing on December 10.  Due to a severe 
snowstorm, however, the case agent was unable to attend the 
hearing in Pittsburgh on that date, and the case was then listed 
for disposition, by trial or the entry of a guilty plea, on 
December 16. 
                     
1.  Since the district court's intent appears to have been to 
exclude the time from the granting of the extension until the 
date when pretrial motions were actually due, we interpret the 
exclusion to extend until October 26.  Accordingly, once this 
time was excluded, the Speedy Trial Act deadline for the 
commencement of the trial became December 22, 1992. 
 
 
 On December 16, the defendant and his attorney 
requested a 30-day continuance so that plea negotiations could 
continue.  After engaging in an extensive colloquy with counsel 
and after questioning the defendant personally, the district 
court judge granted a continuance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(8)(A)2 and made the following findings: 
 I think that the ends of justice will be 
served by taking this action, and those ends 
outweigh the best interests of the public and 
the defendant in a speedy trial; and the 
reason is that this gives the government an 
opportunity to get more information 
concerning the drug trade.  It gives the 
defendant an opportunity to furnish more 
information.  This is not only to the benefit 
of the defendant, but might benefit the 
government, and, therefore, we will grant the 
motion. 
 
 Eventually, the plea negotiations broke down.  Although 
the defendant expressed a willingness to plead guilty to counts 
one and two, he refused to plead guilty to count three.  The 
defendant's attorney then moved to dismiss the indictment under 
the Speedy Trial Act, but that motion was denied, and trial on 
all counts began on January 20, 1993. 
 At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that the 
defendant had arranged to meet an informant for the purpose of 
selling him heroin and that this meeting had occurred within a 
short distance of a playground where children were playing.  The 
                     
2.  We interpret the district court's order as excluding the 30 




prosecution's evidence also showed that at this meeting the 
informant had given the defendant $200 and that the defendant had 
instructed a young man or boy to hand over a package of heroin to 
the informant.  The tape recording of the conversation between 
the defendant and the informant revealed that the defendant had 
introduced the young man or boy as his nephew Jason, and the 
prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant's fiancee had 
a nephew named Jason who was 16 years old at the time of the 
offense. 
 The defendant testified and admitted that he had 
participated in the transaction and that it had occurred within 
1000 feet of a playground.  He insisted, however, that his 
accomplice was not his nephew Jason but a different person, who 
was 18 years old at the time of the offense.  The jury found the 
defendant guilty on counts one and two but not guilty on count 
three.  After denying reconsideration of the defendant's motion 
to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, the 
district court sentenced the defendant to 41 months' 
imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. 
 The defendant first argues that he was not brought to 
trial within 70 days from his initial appearance, as required by 
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).  The defendant 
contends that the district court's contrary holding was incorrect 
 
 
primarily because (a) the district court erroneously excluded the 
period from October 6, 1992, when the defendant's attorney moved 
for an extension of time to file pretrial motions, until October 
26, 1992, when those motions were due, and (b) the district court 
incorrectly excluded the period of delay resulting from the 
continuance that was sought by the defense for the purpose of 
pursuing plea negotiations.  As previously noted, the district 
court excluded both of these periods under 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(8)(A), which requires the exclusion of 
 [a]ny period of delay resulting from a 
continuance granted by any judge on his own 
motion or at the request of the defendant or 
his counsel or at the request of the attorney 
for the Government if the judge granted such 
continuance on the basis of his findings that 
the ends of justice served by taking such 
action outweigh the best interest of the 
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.  
No such period of delay resulting from a 
continuance granted by the court in 
accordance with this paragraph shall be 
excludable under this subsection unless the 
court sets forth, in the record of the case, 
either orally or in writing, its reasons for 
finding that the ends of justice served by 
the granting of such continuance outweigh the 
best interests of the public and the 
defendant in a speedy trial. 
 
 The defendant's arguments are disturbing because he 
would have us order the dismissal of his indictment based on 
continuances that his own attorney sought.  As we warned in 
United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 883 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 97 (1993), "[d]efendants cannot be wholly free 
to abuse the system by requesting (h)(8) continuances and then 
 
 
argue that their convictions should be vacated because the 
continuances they acquiesced in were granted."  See also, e.g., 
United States v. Culp, 7 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2108 (1994); United States v. Kucik, 909 F.2d 
206, 210-211 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1070 (1991).  
Rejection of the defendant's arguments might be justified on this 
ground alone, but in any event a straightforward application of 
the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act leads to the same 
conclusion. 
 A. 1.  We turn first to the exclusion of the period 
from October 6, 1992, when the district court granted the defense 
motion for an extension of time to file pretrial motions, until 
October 26, 1992, when those motions were due.  The defendant 
contends that this period could not properly be excluded under 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) because the district court did not comply 
with the procedural requirement that it "set[] forth, in the 
record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for 
finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of [the] 
continuance outweigh[ed] the best interests of the public and the  
defendant in a speedy trial."  18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(8)(A).  We do 
not agree.   
 In granting the extension, the court stated that it 
"[found] that the additional period [was] necessary to enable 
counsel for the defendant adequately to investigate and prepare 
pretrial motions."  A9.  Moreover, in denying the defendant's 
 
 
motion to reconsider his motion for dismissal of the indictment, 
the district court elaborated that defense counsel "needed time 
to decide what to do, to examine the tape recording for example, 
or to investigate the birthdate of the alleged minor and perhaps 
try to suppress both."  A5.   We have held that the statement of 
reasons required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) need not be placed 
on the record at the time when the continuance is granted.  
United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983).  See also United States v. Lattany, 
982 F.2d at 877; United States v. Brenna, 878 F.2d 117, 122 (3d 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Rivera Construction Co., 863 F.2d 
293, 297 (3d Cir. 1988).  Consequently, the explanation provided 
by the district court in denying reconsideration may also be 
properly considered.  Viewing the order granting the continuance 
and the order denying reconsideration together, we are convinced 
that the district court provided a sufficient statement of 
reasons to satisfy 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(8)(A). 
 While acknowledging our prior holdings that the 
requisite statement of reasons need not be made when the 
continuance is granted, the defendant contends that the 
explanation given by the district court in denying 
reconsideration cannot properly be taken into account under 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) because this explanation may not 
correspond with the actual reasons for granting the continuance.  
See Appellant's Br. at 29.  However, we see no factual support 
 
 
for this argument in the record.  In granting the continuance, 
the court expressly relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) and stated 
that defense counsel needed more time to investigate and prepare 
pretrial motions.  In denying reconsideration, the court 
mentioned some of the avenues of investigation that defense 
counsel might have wished to pursue.  Thus, the reason for the 
finding -- that defense counsel's need to explore possible 
pretrial motions outweighed the countervailing speedy trial 
interests -- remained the same throughout. 
 2.  The defendant next suggests that, even if the 
district court made the finding required by 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(8)(A), that finding was wrong because defense counsel's 
need for extra time to work on possible pretrial motions did not 
outweigh the interests that would have been served by a speedier 
trial.  Characterizing this case as one involving a "non-complex, 
single drug transaction," Appellant's Br. at 29, the defendant 
suggests that his attorney should have been able to investigate 
and prepare any pretrial motions without the need for an 
extension.  We reject this argument as well. 
 First, we hold that in appropriate circumstances an 
"ends of justice" continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) may 
be granted to permit the preparation of pretrial motions.3  In 
                     
3.  Courts of Appeals have disagreed on whether delay 
attributable to the preparation of pretrial motions is excludable 
under the general language of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), which 
applies to periods of delay "resulting from other proceedings 
concerning the defendant."  Many circuits have held such delays 
excludable.  See United States v. Hoslett, 998 F.2d 648, 654-57 
 
 
determining whether to grant an "ends of justice" continuance, a 
court is required to consider the following factors: 
  (ii)  Whether the case is so unusual or 
so complex, due to the number of defendants, 
the nature of the prosecution, or the 
existence of novel questions of fact or law, 
that it is unreasonable to expect adequate 
preparation for pretrial proceedings or for 
the trial itself within the time limits 
established by this section. . . . 
 
  (iv)  Whether the failure to grant such 
a continuance in a case which, taken as a 
whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to 
fall within clause (ii), would deny the 
defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, 
would unreasonably deny the defendant or the 
Government continuity of counsel, or would 
deny counsel for the defendant or the 
attorney for the Government the reasonable 
time necessary for effective preparation, 
taking into account the exercise of due 
diligence. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) and (iv) (emphasis added).  Because 
subsection (ii) refers expressly to "preparation for pretrial 
proceedings," it seems plain that an "ends of justice" 
continuance may be granted for the purpose of giving counsel 
additional time to prepare motions in "unusual" or "complex" 
(..continued) 
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 
F.2d 902, 913-14 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), opinion 
supplemented on rehearing, 881 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990); United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 
1440, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Montoya, 827 
F.2d 143, 153 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 
232, 238 (1st Cir. 1982).  The Sixth Circuit, however, disagrees.  
See United States v. Moran, 998 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (6th Cir. 
1993).  In light of our holding with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(8), we need not address this issue. 
 
 
cases.  Moreover, we conclude that a continuance for the 
preparation of pretrial motions is also permissible under some 
circumstances in cases that are not "unusual or complex."  
Subsection (iv) makes it clear that a continuance "necessary for 
effective preparation" is allowed in such cases,4 and we think it 
is natural to interpret the phrase "effective preparation" in 
subsection (iv) as having the same meaning as the longer phrase -
- "adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial 
itself" -- in subsection (ii).  Consequently, whether or not a 
case is "unusual" or "complex," an "ends of justice" continuance 
may in appropriate circumstances be granted in order to provide 
adequate time for the preparation of pretrial motions. 
 Second, we see no basis for reversing the district 
court's conclusion that such a continuance was appropriate in 
this case.  "Our inquiry is limited to the question whether the 
district court abused its discretion in granting this 
continuance," Brooks, 697 F.2d at 522, and we hold that it did 
not. 
 3.  The defendant's final argument regarding the 
exclusion of the period covered by the extension of time for the 
preparation of pretrial motions is based on Rule 12.1(B) of the 
                     
4.  See United States v. Dota,        F.3d.        (9th Cir. 
1994) ("An ends-of-justice continuance may be justified on 
grounds that one side needs more time to prepare for trial[,] 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(b)(iv)[, even though a case is] not `complex' 
as that term is defined in § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) . . . ."); United 
States v.  Monroe, 833 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 
 
Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.5  The defendant argues that the order 
granting defense counsel's motion for an extension was "void ab 
initio" because the motion was not filed within ten days after 
arraignment, as required by this local rule.  We do not accept 
this argument.  First, the defendant cites no authority for the 
proposition that a motion filed in violation of a local rule is 
void ab initio for Speedy Trial Act purposes, and we are aware of 
no such authority.  Second, it does not appear that the local 
rule was violated.  As the district court noted in denying 
reconsideration, the rule provides that "the court, in its 
discretion for good cause shown, may permit a motion to be made 
and heard at a later time."  By entertaining and granting the 
extension request, the district court appears to have implicitly 
granted an extension of the time period specified in the local 
rule. 
                     
5.  This provision states: 
 
  Motions under Rule 12 and Rule 41(e) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall 
be made either before a plea is entered or 
within ten days after arraignment, unless the 
court extends the time either at arraignment, 
or upon written application made within the 
said ten-day period.  Such application shall 
set forth the grounds upon which it is made 
and shall be served on the United States 
attorney.   The court, in its discretion, 
may, however, for good cause shown, permit a 
motion to be made and heard at a later date. 
 
 
 We therefore hold that the district court was correct 
in excluding, for Speedy Trial purposes, the period from the 
granting of defense counsel's request for an extension of time to 
file pretrial motions until that extension expired. 
 B.  We next consider the defendant's argument that the 
district court erroneously excluded the period covered by his 
attorney's request for a continuance so that plea negotiations 
could be pursued.  The defendant seems to suggest that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(h)(8) cannot apply to a continuance granted for this 
purpose, but we do not agree.  Nothing in the language of 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) suggests that an "ends of justice" 
continuance may not be granted for this purpose.6  Instead, the 
statutory language refers broadly to "[a]ny period of delay 
resulting from a continuance granted" to serve "the ends of 
justice."  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).  In current federal 
practice, plea negotiations play a vital role.  We therefore see 
no reason why an "ends of justice" continuance may not be granted 
in appropriate circumstances to permit plea negotiations to 
                     
6.  Congress specifically provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(I) 
for the exclusion of "delay resulting from consideration by the 
court of a proposed plea agreement to be entered into by the 
defendant and the attorney for the Government."  This provision 
does not suggest, however, that Congress meant to preclude an 
"ends of justice" continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) for 
the purpose of permitting plea negotiations to continue.  "Ends 
of justice" continuances under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) were 
obviously intended for use in situations that do not fall within 




continue.7  See United States v. Williams, 12 F.3d 452, 460 (5th 
Cir. 1994).  Cf. United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 150 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (delay caused by plea bargaining excluded under 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D)). 
 While we believe that such continuances should be 
granted sparingly, we hold that the district court's exercise of 
discretion in this case was proper.  Defense counsel strongly 
urged the court to grant the continuance, noting that his client 
                     
7.  Our holding is consistent with the decision in United States 
v. Perez-Reveles, 715 F.2d 1348, 1350-53 (9th Cir. 1983).  In 
that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had 
erred in excluding a certain period of time under 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(8)(A) because "the district court's rulings did not 
include the explicit findings" required by that provision.  715 
F.2d at 1353.  See also United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 563 
n.13 (9th Cir. 1992)(summarizing holding of Perez-Reveles).  
Because the findings in this case were more extensive and better 
supported than those in Perez-Reveles, we see no conflict between 
the two decisions. 
  
    We recognize, however, that there may be tension between our 
decision and the dictum in Perez-Reveles that "[n]egotiation of a 
plea bargain is not one of the factors supporting exclusion 
provided in section 3161(h)(8)(B)."  715 F.2d at 1352 (footnote 
omitted).  While it is certainly true that the need for more time 
in order to conduct plea negotiations is not among the factors 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)-(iv), it does not follow 
that a district court cannot consider this factor.  Title 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B) (emphasis added) states that: 
 
 [T]he factors, among others, which a judge 
shall consider in determining whether to 
grant a continuance . . . [are those set out 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)-(iv)].   
 
Thus, it is clear that a judge may (and, indeed, "shall") 
consider other factors as well.  If the Perez-Reveles court 
reasoned to the contrary, we must disagree.   
 
 
was offering to provide information that could be helpful in 
other drug investigations and that such cooperation could enable 
his client to obtain a more favorable sentence.  A33-34, 37-38.  
The prosecution informed the court that the defendant had made a 
"very good and very thorough proffer" and that the parties were 
"making progress" in reaching an agreement.  A29, 34.  The court 
was aware that negotiations had been hampered due to the illness 
and hospitalization of the DEA agent who was knowledgeable about 
drug dealing in the area of Pittsburgh with which the defendant 
was familiar.  A 38.  The court questioned the defendant himself 
and verified that he preferred to continue plea negotiations 
rather than going to trial immediately.  A40-47.  Under all of 
these circumstances, the "ends of justice" continuance was 
properly granted.  We thus hold that the Speedy Trial Act was not 
violated in this case.8 
 
 III. 
 The defendant next contends that the district court 
committed several errors in calculating his sentence.   
 A.  The defendant's first sentencing argument is that 
the district court misapplied U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which concerns 
"acceptance of responsibility."  This provision states: 
                     
8.  We have considered all of the defendant's Speedy Trial Act 
arguments that are not directly addressed in the body of this 
opinion, and we find those arguments to lack merit. 
 
 
 (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance 
of responsibility for his offense, decrease the 
offense level by 2 levels. 
 
 (b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under 
subsection (a), the offense level determined prior 
to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or 
greater, and the defendant has assisted 
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of 
his own misconduct by taking one or more of the 
following steps: 
 
  (1) timely providing complete information to the 
government concerning his own involvement in 
the offense; or 
 
  (2) timely notifying authorities of his intention 
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting 
the government to avoid preparing for trial 
and permitting the court to allocate its 
resources efficiently. 
 
  decrease the offense level by 1 additional level. 
 
 
The district court granted a two-offense-level decrease under 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), but the defendant maintains that he was 
entitled to an additional one-offense-level decrease under 
subsection (b).  In rejecting this argument, the district court 
stated: 
 I don't think that you would be entitled to 
that [the third point] unless he had accepted 
responsibility for all of the counts. 
 
Supp. App. 7.  The court then added: 
 [H]e didn't accept responsibility for all of 
his counts, and he has been given a reduction 
of two points for accepting responsibility 
for the first two counts.  That's the counts 
he was convicted of.  But he went to trial.  
Fortunately he won, but I think [the 
 
 
probation officer] is right in giving him 
only a two-point reduction. 
 
Id. at 8.  Thus, it appears that the district court's denial of 
the additional one-offense-level decrease was based at least in 
part on the defendant's refusal to plead guilty to count III, on 
which he was acquitted. 
 The defendant argues that the district court's ruling 
was inconsistent with United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 
(3d Cir. 1992).  In that case, two defendants, Rodriguez and 
Anderson, were willing to plead guilty to some of the charges 
against them but not to others, and they therefore went to trial.  
Rodriguez refused to plead guilty to a firearms possession count 
on which he was acquitted at trial.  Anderson was willing to 
plead guilty to a charge of conspiring to distribute cocaine, but 
he refused to admit that the object of the conspiracy was to 
distribute more than three kilograms of cocaine, and on appeal 
our court agreed with his position concerning the amount of 
cocaine involved.  At the sentencing stage, Rodriguez and 
Anderson argued that they were entitled to an offense-level 
decrease under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 even though they had not pled 
guilty, but the district court denied that decrease.   
 On appeal, we concluded that Rodriguez's and Anderson's 
sentences should be vacated and that they should be resentenced. 
We noted that a defendant who elects to go to trial is not 
categorically barred from receiving an offense-level reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility.  975 F.2d at 1009.  We then 
 
 
concluded that "when the trial court decided whether to award the 
two level reduction, it erred in failing to consider the reasons 
for which Anderson and Rodriguez refused to plead to the entire 
indictment, along with the apparent validity of those reasons."  
Id. at 1009.  We therefore remanded "for consideration of this 
issue by the district court" at resentencing.  Id. 
 Our holding in Rodriguez essentially reiterates the 
rules set out in U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Application Note 1.  That Note 
states that it is appropriate for a court to consider a 
defendant's "truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the 
offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully or not falsely denying 
any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is 
accountable under [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)."  This 
Note then adds: 
 Note that a defendant is not required to 
volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant 
conduct beyond the offense of conviction in 
order to obtain a reduction under subsection 
(a).  A defendant may remain silent in 
respect to relevant conduct beyond the 
offense of conviction without affecting his 
ability to obtain a reduction under this 
subsection.  However, a defendant who falsely 
denies, or frivolously contests, relevant 
conduct that the court determines to be true 
has acted in a manner inconsistent with 
acceptance of responsibility. . . . 
 
 Applying these rules here, we believe that the 
defendant's sentence must be vacated and that this case must be 
remanded for resentencing.  Based on the statements made by the 
district court, it appears that the court may have incorrectly 
 
 
considered the defendant's refusal to admit conduct not 
comprising part of the offenses of conviction.  On appeal, the 
government has propounded other bases on which an offense-level 
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 could, in its view, be denied.  
We will not address these grounds here but will leave them to be 
considered in the first instance by the district court. 
 B.  The defendant argues that the district court erred 
in awarding one criminal history point under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) 
for his prior sentence for the summary offense of harassment.  
Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), prior sentences for specified 
offenses, "by whatever name they are known," are generally not 
counted.  One of these specified offenses is "disorderly 
conduct," and the defendant argues that the offense of 
"harassment" under Pennsylvania law is "equivalent" to 
"disorderly conduct" and therefore should not be counted. 
 We need not and consequently do not reach this 
question.   The district court calculated that the defendant had 
11 criminal history points and therefore placed him in criminal 
history category V.  Even if we accepted the defendant's argument 
concerning his sentence for harassment, the defendant would still 
have 10 criminal history points; he would thus remain in criminal 
history category V, and his sentence would be unaffected.9 
                     
9.  By instructing that sentencing courts should not count a 
prior sentence for "disorderly conduct" "by whatever name [it is] 
known" (U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1)), the Sentencing Commission 
appears to mean that sentencing courts should determine whether a 
particular offense is in essence the same as the offense of 
disorderly conduct as that offense is generally understood.  This 
 
 
 C.  The defendant's final argument concerning his 
sentence is that the district court erred in finding that he was 
a "supervisor" of criminal activity under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) and 
in thus increasing his offense level by two levels.  We review 
the district court's finding for clear error.  United States v. 
Balletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 969 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1191 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 497 (1992).  Applying that standard, we reject the 
defendant's argument. 
 The evidence at trial showed that the defendant 
directed a young man or a boy, whom the defendant identified as 
his cousin, to deliver a package of heroin to an informant.  The 
evidence also established that, after this delivery was made, the 
defendant criticized the young man or boy for being too open in 
his manner of handing over the package.  This evidence, although 





instruction, however, is not easy to follow because "disorderly 
conduct" is "[a] term of loose and indefinite meaning (except 
when defined by statutes). . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 469 
(6th ed. 1990).  See also IV C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 
523 at 177-78 (14th ed 1981) ("The offense varies significantly 
from state to state, and a uniform and consistent pattern is 
difficult to discern.").  It would therefore be helpful if the 
Commission clarified what it means by the essence of the offense 
of disorderly conduct. 
 
 
 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the 
defendant's conviction, but we vacate his sentence and remand for 
resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 
